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Economic Rational Underlying Tying／搭售背后的经济理论
Applications to Tetra Pak case／应用于工商总局利乐案
Conclusion & Remarks／结论&评价
Economic Rational Underlying Tying- Leveraging by Foreclosure/ “杠杆”作用
Leveraging by Foreclosure ／通过 “杠杆”作用排斥另一个市场的竞争
Leveraging into the tied market may contribute to maintain the dominant
position in the tying market／利用“杠杆”作用来维护基础市场的垄断地位
The single monopolistic profit critique and accordingly Tying may be made to yield a superior product upon integration／单一垄断利润原则以及整合更优产品的正当理由
A competitivecomplementarymarketmaybegoodforthemonopolistinthetyingmarket, because it will yield a superiorproduct upon integration－互补市场的竞争是否更有利于基础市场的垄断者－基于两个产品的整合会产生更优质的组合
Do the math: 如果面包价格高于1元，消费者会转向购买蛋糕，假设面包的价格由面粉和糖的价格来决定,在面粉市场上的垄断者是欢迎糖的市场的竞争，因为这会提供更加物美价廉的糖，最终会增强面包整体的竞争力
Tying may be made for metering and price discrimination, while price-discrimination may be good or at least neutral ? －搭售可能是出于“测量”的目的和实现价格差异，价格差异也许是好事，或者至少是中性的？
SAIC: “利乐在提供设备和技术服务过程中以多种方式限制和诱导客户使用利乐包材的行为，……..，影响了其他包材厂商的销售，提高了其他经营者的竞争成本，损害了包材市场的竞争。”
Double Entry Problem – SAIC’s decision appears to say nothing／双重进入的问题
Is the single monopolistic profit critique applicable－单一垄断利润原则是否适用于利乐 ?
Do the math : 假设利乐设备是1000元一台，包材市场的充分竞争导致包材价格下降，对于下游企业来讲，设备＋包材的整体价格下降，这会导致设备的销量提升？如果是这样，设备市场的垄断者为什么要垄断包材市场？
Summary／总结
对于知识产权领域，对创新的过度抑制（over-deterrence）远胜于对遏制不足（under-deterrence）的担忧
对于具有市场支配地位的企业滥用市场支配地位的认定，特别是知识产权领域：对创新“过度抑制（over-deterrence）”的担忧要优先于对“遏制不足（under-deterrence）”的担忧，应避免过度适用反垄断法挫伤竞争和创新：
Justice Scalia in Trinko:
“Applyingthe requirement of Section 2 can be difficult because the means of illicitexclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad. Mistakeninferences and the resulting false condemnations are especially costly, becausethey chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”
To avoidover-deterrence, respecting tying, before concluding the bad-guy story,advisable to examine the four economic rational／为了避免对创新的过度抑制，关于搭售，建议思考以下经济原理，并回答是否适用于具体案件，避免轻下结论:
